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Post PadnIa: fPdf!Ia's Puzzles for Review
in State and Federal Courts

1. Introduction
Federal law provides that noncitizens convicted of designated crimes may be deported from the country, barred
from returning, and denied the opportunity to become
United States citizens. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Padillav. Kentucky,' lower courts disagreed over
whether and when a lawyer's deficient advice about the
deportation consequences of conviction violated a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Only three state courts had interpreted the Sixth
Amendment to impose a duty on defense counsel to provide advice about the risks of deportation to clients who
are pleading guilty.2 All federal courts of appeals and most
state courts had concluded that counsel had no constitutional duty to advise a defendant about the collateral
consequences of conviction, including deportation.3 Most
of these jurisdictions nevertheless made an exception for
affirmative misadvice by counsel.4
Then came the Padilladecision. Jose Padilla, a Honduran national who had been a lawful permanent resident of
the United States for more than forty years, pleaded guilty
to smuggling marijuana, allegedly relying on counsel's
assurance that he would not be deported as a result. Padilla's counsel was wrong, and deportation proceedings
ensued. On state postconviction review, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffective assistance
claim, explaining that deportation was a collateral consequence of conviction and that defense attorneys had no
duty under the Sixth Amendment to advise their clients
about collateral consequences.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel
requires competent advice about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Although Padilla himself had
received misleading advice, the Court did not limit its
holding to affirmative misrepresentations. Instead, the
Court held that the right to effective counsel, as interpreted in Strickland v. Washingtons and Hill v. Lockhart,6
requires advice about deportation that would be "reasonable under prevailing professional norms."7 Thus,
failure to provide any advice about deportation may be
as unreasonable as faulty advice when the immigration
consequences are clear.

The Court also remarked that the distinction between
direct and collateral consequences developed in a line of
cases that defined the due process requirements for a
knowing plea of guilty, and that "we have never applied
the direct/collateral distinction to a sixth amendment
claim." 8 Instead, the Court explained that
deportation is intimately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely difficult to classify as
either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because
that distinction is thus ill suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation,
advice regarding deportation is not categorically
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.9
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The decision in Padillahas potentially far-reaching
consequences. More than 128,000 noncitizens with criminal convictions were deported in 2009. Approximately
95,000 noncitizens were incarcerated in state and federal
prisons and jails as of June 30, 2009.10 An unknown proportion of deportees and prisoners who face deportation
will bring Padillaclaims. And because the Court in Padilla
interpreted the Sixth Amendment to provide greater protection for defendants than most jurisdictions previously
had recognized," many will be raising their claims for the
first time years after they were convicted, or for a second
time, having already lost the same claim in state or federal
court.
This article addresses the many issues facing the state
and federal courts that must resolve these claims.2 Fears
that the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement will strain
the resources of the lower judiciary by triggering a flood of
hearings and retrials, we believe, are unfounded. Instead,
most Padillaclaims will be rejected, either because of procedural restrictions on state and federal postconviction
review, or because the claimant was not prejudiced by
counsel's actions.
II. When a Padilla Claim May Be Raised
Most defendants will be raising their Padillaclaims in the
postconviction context, where they will face the many barriers to review that we discuss in part IV of this article. A
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defendant can avoid these obstacles to relief by bringing
his claims at the trial level. Few defendants will enjoy this
opportunity, however. A defendant might attempt to file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, but
such motions must be filed by substitute counsel, and
before sentencing. 3 Some jurisdictions authorize review
of counsel's performance in a motion in arrest of judgment, but the window of opportunity to file such motions
can be quite short.'4
Most Padillaclaims will be unreviewable on direct
appeal as well.'5 Generally, defendants must postpone raising ineffective assistance claims until postconviction
proceedings, when an evidentiary hearing can be held if
necessary.' 6 An exception exists for claims already apparent in the record.'7 Additionally, some states require a
known claim of ineffective assistance to be raised on direct
appeal if the appellant is represented by new counsel, but
if factual development is necessary, courts tend not to
8
remand for a hearing during the direct appeal.' Instead,
most Padillaclaims will be reviewed after direct review is
complete, in state and federal postconviction proceedings.
III. Express Waivers of Review
Waiver provisions are increasingly common in plea agreements. Although some purport to waive any legal
challenge to either the conviction or sentence in appeal or
postconviction proceedings,' 9 these provisions are not
valid as to claims which, like Padilla,attack the validity of
the plea agreement itself.2 0 In several jurisdictions, courts
refuse to uphold all waivers of the right to raise ineffective
assistance claims, and in some states rules of professional
conduct ban as unethical all such waivers.' Where courts
have found such claims waived, the attorney's ineffectiveness did not implicate the voluntariness of the plea.
IV. Padilla on Postconviction Review
Because of the relatively complex procedures attendant to
postconviction review, prisoners raising Padilla claims in
collateral proceedings face several additional barriers to
relief.
A. Retroactive Application and Teague
The first wave of Padillaclaimants will have to show that
Padillaapplies to criminal judgments that were final
before it was issued. In Teague v. Lane," the Supreme
Court held that ordinarily, federal habeas courts may not
apply "new" rules of constitutional criminal procedure
announced only after the state courts had reviewed the
prisoner's case. The ban on the consideration of such socalled new rules is also applied by federal courts when
reviewing collateral challenges to federal criminal judgments under S 2255, and by many state courts as a
3
limitation in their own state postconviction proceedings.
In Teague itself, Justice Sandra O'Connor wrote that a
new rule generally "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government. To
put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result

240

FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER

was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final." 4 Teague also bars
25
retroactive application of settled law to a new context.
Subsequent decisions evince a broad definition of new,
including at times decisions that resolve any issue
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."26 Nevertheless, the Justices have also stated that "the standard
for determining when a case establishes a new rule is
'objective,' and the mere existence ofconflicting authority
does not necessarily mean a rule is new. "27 And a line of
authority emphasizes that specific applications of rules of
general applicability, particularly the rule in Strickland, do
not create new rules.28
Because the Supreme Court in Padillahad no need to
discuss retroactivity, the issue remains open. Opponents
of retroactive application of Padillawill emphasize that
only three state courts (and no federal courts) had
endorsed the position adopted by the majority in Padilla,
so the decision dearly effected an abrupt change in the
legal landscape. The sheer volume of precedent to the contrary would indicate a novel rule under some formulations
of the rule in Teague.2 9 Nearly every lower court to address
the issue has, however, determined that Padilla is not a
new rule,30 and we agree.
In Padilla,the Court clearly applied Strickland, finding
deficiency solely with reference to prevailing professional
norms. Accordingly, lower courts appropriately characterize the decision as applying "a well-established rule of law
in a new way based on the specific facts of a particular
case."3 ' The Court in Padillarelied on an unqualified
application of the well-known standard that it had first
announced in Stricklandin 1984 and applied to guilty
pleas in Hill in 1985. Padillamerely reiterates that no
shorthand version or alternative test-such as one that
distinguishes between collateral and direct consequences
of conviction-can serve as a substitute. In other words,
Padillais like other Strickland progeny that apply
retroactively.31
Two other statements suggest that the Court will determine that Padillais not a new rule. In 2001, the Court
observed in dicta that all reasonably competent counsel
would advise their clients about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.33 Additionally, the Padillaopinion
itself suggests retroactivity. Appearing as amicus, the
United States argued that requiring counsel to do more
than avoid affirmative misadvice "could strain judicial and
prosecutorial resources" because most "defendants would
likely not challenge their pleas until years later, when the
collateral consequences of the conviction first become evident," leading to "an influx of challenges to long-final
pleas."34 The Court stated that "it had 'given serious consideration' to the argument that its ruling would open the
'floodgates' to new litigation challenging prior guilty
pleas."35 Without a mention of Teague, the Court explained
that its decision would not likely affect the finality of most
convictions for two reasons: (i) because presumably counsel have fulfilled their duty under prevailing norms of
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professional conduct to provide their clients with immigration advice and (2) because few prisoners will risk
6
losing the benefits of their plea bargains.3
If the weight of emerging authority is wrong, and
Padillais a new rule of criminal procedure under Teague,
it almost certainly falls outside the extremely narrow
exception for watershed rules that implement previously
unrecognized "bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of a proceeding," and protect against an
37
"impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction."
The Supreme Court has never found a new rule to be of
this magnitude, and has instead intimated repeatedly that
only Gideon itself qualifies.38
In state postconviction proceedings, federal Teague
jurisprudence does not determine retroactivity, although
9
it is often relevant. In Danforth v. Minnesota,3 the
Supreme Court decided that states are free to apply retroactively a broader class of rules of constitutional criminal
40
procedure than that defined in Teague. Some states
have explicitly done so, whereas others have adopted
Teague or specific progeny to limit state postconviction
4
review. 1
B. Statute of Limitations for Filing
Waiver clauses and retroactivity analysis should not bar
Padillaclaims, but filing deadlines might. Federal (and
many state) statutes limit the time period for seeking collateral review. A federal petitioner has one year to file his
claims, beginning on the date the judgment becomes
final.42 Although a majority of states have similar limitations periods, some lack them entirely or follow a more
flexible laches approach that resembles pre-AEDPA43 federal law.44 Many petitioners will raise Padillaclaims only
after these deadlines elapse, often because counsel's error
became apparent only after immigration proceedings
commenced.
Several provisions of federal law allow a belated commencement of the statute of limitations. These provisions,
however, are unlikely to apply to Padillaclaims. One such
provision commences the limitations period on "the date
on which the [new] right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
45
applicable to cases on collateral review." As we have
argued in this article, Padillais not a newly recognized
rule at all. Even if Padillawere a so-called new rule, this
section could not apply until the Supreme Court determined that Padillaapplied retroactively. Because the right
would have been initially recognized on the day Padilla
issued, the Court would have to issue its retroactivity decision by March 31, 2011.46 Even if such a swift resolution
were possible, Padillafails to satisfy either of the exceptions that would allow it to be made retroactively
applicable.47
Another provision delays the beginning of the one-year
filing dock if the "factual predicate of' (for state prisoners)
or "facts supporting" (for federal prisoners) "the claim ...

presented could not have been discovered earlier through
the exercise of due diligence."48 This provision applies, for
example, when a prisoner files her claim promptly after
learning that counsel successfully concealed a serious conflict of interest. Padillaclaims, however, do not rely on
facts discoverable only after a conviction becomes final.
Every defendant has firsthand knowledge of the advice she
received from her lawyer before pleading guilty, and most
defendants will know at that time whether they are United
States citizens. The subsequent discovery of an immigration consequence is not a fact, but is instead a question
of law, similar to the application of sentencing statutes,
rules, and guidelines. Advice about immigration consequences is either unreasonable when delivered or it is not;
it does not become unreasonable only after removal is
imminent.
In rare cases, courts may invoke the doctrine of equita9
ble tolling to excuse a late filing. In Holland v. Florida,4
the Supreme Court joined every lower federal court in recognizing that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations
is theoretically available where an "extraordinary circumstance" impeded timely filing and the petitioner had been
pursuing his rights diligently.5 oThe Eleventh Circuit had
held that attorney error during habeas proceedings, where
no right to counsel applies, could not justify equitable tolling absent "bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental
impairment or so forth."5' The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that egregiously negligent behavior by an attorney
could constitute exceptional circumstances justifying equitable tolling.
Padillaclaimants are no more likely than others to
demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling under Holland.5 ' Deficient, even egregious advice given at the plea
stage does not directly impair the subsequent filing of a
postconviction petition.53 Moreover, nothing in the Court's
opinion is inconsistent with the conclusion of lower courts
that the inability to speak English can justify tolling only
where the prisoner also shows diligent efforts to obtain
54
translation assistance.
C. Padilla Claims Raised in Second or Successive
Petitions
Petitioners raising Padillaclaims in a second petition face
yet another barrier to review. Federal courts may not
entertain a new claim in a second or successive petition
unless the claim meets one of two very narrow exceptions,
neither of which fit a Padillaclaim. 55 First, a second petition is permitted if it relies on "a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."56 As
explained previously, Padillalikely does not establish a
new rule of constitutional law, and if it does, it is a rule
57
that will almost certainly not apply retroactively. Likewise, the exception permitting a second petition if the
claim relies on facts that could not have been discovered
sooner will be as useless to a petitioner who omits his
Padillaclaim from his first petition as it is to a petitioner
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whose first petition is untimely. On top of that, an admission of guilt in open court will generally belie subsequent
claims that "no reasonable factfinder would have found
8
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."5
What of the petitioner whose claim was properly raised
in the first petition, only to be rejected in violation of
Padilla? In this situation, the federal statute bars relief,
59
providing only one opportunity for federal review.
D. Procedural Default: Failure to Raise Padilla
Claim Earlier
6
Generally, the defense of procedural default o bars postconviction relief in state or federal court for claims that the
petitioner failed to raise correctly in earlier proceedings.
Unless a state requires ineffective assistance of counsel
claims to be raised on appeal, petitioners must raise their
Padillaclaims in their first postconviction petitions. Thus,
procedural default should not affect federal prisoners who
raise their Padillaclaims in their first S 2255 motions, or
most state prisoners who raise their Padillaclaims in their
first state postconviction petitions.
Where it does apply, procedural default is excused if
the petitioner can show either (i) cause for failing to raise
the claim earlier and prejudice resulting therefrom or
(2) that, due to the petitioner's probable innocence, a
miscarriage of justice would occur if the claim were not
adjudicated on the merits. Because the right to counsel
extends to appeal, cause for the failure to raise a Padilla
claim on direct appeal exists if appellate counsel's failure to
raise the claim amounted to ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Showing prejudice here requires showing a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal
would have been different if appellate counsel had raised
the issue-that is, a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have received relief on appeal for his Padilla
claim. Petitioners who fail to raise the claim in state postconviction proceedings, however, will probably be unable
to establish cause, because there is no right to the effective
assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings. 6 ' The impossibility of success before Padillawas
decided also fails to constitute cause for not raising the
issue.6 As explained previously, a Padillaclaimant's
admission of guilt generally precludes any showing that
he is probably factually innocent.
E. Deference to State Decisions Under § 2254(d)
State prisoners seeking federal habeas relief face one additional barrier: deference to state court determinations of
law and fact. When federal courts review claims rejected
on the merits by state courts, S 22 54 (d) permits relief only
when the state court's decision was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, dearly established law." 63 A state court does not decide the merits of a
claim when it rejects the claim as procedurally defaulted,
filed in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or barred as
a part of a successive petition. 64 Merits decisions are
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reviewed for reasonableness, not correctness, and are
judged by only "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
"Clearly established federal law" includes Supreme Court
decisions establishing "whatever would qualify as an old
rule under our Teague jurisprudence." 6 5 In Padilla, the
Court relied almost exclusively on its own precedents.
Thus, for Padilla,a finding of retroactivity compels the
conclusion that the rule therein became clearly established
according to some pre-Padilladecision of the Court.
Federal courts, including those finding Padillato be an
old rule, have yet to grapple with the question of when the
rule in Padillabecame clearly established. The Court first
applied Strickland to guilty pleas in the 1985 decision of
Hill v. Lockhart, holding that "the two-part Strickland v.
Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based
on ineffective assistance of counsel."66 It is Hill that
clearly established the rule in Padilla.
Federal courts afford especially great deference to state
court decisions denying relief based on applications of
general rules such as Strickland.67 Section 22 54 (d) permits
relief, however, where the state court decision rejecting
the petitioner's constitutional claim was either "contrary
to" or an "unreasonable application of' clearly established
federal law. The Court has explained that the contrary to
phrase applies when a state court "arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts."6 8 A state court decision may
meet the "unreasonable application" standard either (i)
by "identiflying] the correct governing principle from
[Supreme Court precedent] but unreasonably appl[ying]
that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case"6 9 or (2) by
"unreasonably extend[ing] a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply (or
unreasonably refus[ing] to extend a legal principle to a new
7
context where it should apply)." o
Many state decisions prior to Padilla applied the
incorrect rule, a truncated version of Hill that excluded
certain categories of advice as a matter of law rather than
referring to prevailing professional norms. These decisions are much less likely to warrant deference. They
may be characterized as either contrary to Hill because
they applied the wrong test or unreasonable applications
of Hill because they unreasonably failed to extend Strickland's case-by-case approach to all advice provided to a
defendant who pleads guilty. 7 ' As for the content of professional standards, the Court itself appears to have
foreclosed any argument that professional norms did not
require such advice, at least for convictions final after
1996.71
F. Fact Finding, Evidentiary Hearings
Two statutory provisions mandate deference to state court
factual findings, such as findings about the existence and
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content of immigration advice. Section 2254(e) affords
state court findings of fact a presumption of correctness,
which the petitioner can only rebut "by clear and convincing evidence." Section 22 54 (d)(2) also provides that a court
may grant relief when a state court's decision is "based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding."73
Because nearly every jurisdiction would previously
have dismissed some or all Padillaclaims as a matter of
law, habeas petitioners are likely not to have developed an
adequate factual record in state court. Where a petitioner
has "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state
court proceedings" by a "lack of diligence, or some greater
fault,"74 the statute prohibits federal courts from conducting an evidentiary hearing, unless the petitioner shows
that the facts underlying the claim show by clear and convincing evidence that "but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense."75 Again, showing innocence will ordinarily be impossible for Padillaclaimants,
who have already admitted guilt.76 Where the petitioner
diligently sought but was denied an evidentiary hearing in
state court, a hearing may be granted or denied in the discretion of the district judge.77
V. Coram Nobis
Habeas relief, in state or federal court, is available only to
a petitioner who is still serving the sentence for the judgment he is attacking. Once a person is no longer in
custody, he is no longer eligible to seek habeas relief or
relief under 2255. He may, however, be able to challenge
his conviction through the writ of coram nobis.78 Even
removal from the country will not moot a coram nobis
challenge because the conviction carries a continuing col79
lateral consequence-the ongoing bar to reentry.
A person convicted of a federal crime cannot obtain
coram nobis relief unless he demonstrates a sound reason
for failing to seek relief earlier. This standard is not as rigid
as the one-year statute of limitations for 2255 filings.o
Nevertheless, an unexplained delay will bar relief for a
8
Padillaclaim that could easily have been raised earlier. '
At least one petitioner has succeeded in securing coram
8
nobis relief for a Padillaclaim. 2
Some states provide coram nobis relief from state convictions as well. Not all the states that offer coram nobis
review will consider a Padilla-typeclaim. In California, for
example, the writ of coram nobis is supposedly reserved for
claims based on newly discovered facts, which would generally exclude Padillaclaims for reasons discussed earlier.8 3
VI.

Getting to the Merits: Establishing Ineffective
Assistance
If a petitioner manages to overcome these procedural barriers, he must demonstrate not only that his attorney's
advice was unreasonable in light of professional norms
but also that the deficiency was prejudicial. The second
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showing is particularly difficult, and many courts never
reach the question of deficiency.
A. When Is Counsel's Representation Deficient?
The Court in Padillanoted:
When the law is not succinct and straightforward ...
a criminal defense attorney need do no more than
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to
give correct advice is equally clear.8 4
Justice Alito, concurring, predicted that distinguishing
between clear and unclear deportation risks will prove
problematic.5 Although authority applying the Court's
language is not well developed, some preliminary outlines
are emerging. Included on the unclear side of the line,
where general warnings suffice, are cases involving the
probability of hardship waivers86 and cases involving misdemeanor offenses that might render the defendant
subject to removal, such as crimes involving moral turpitude.87 Also presumably unclear are the immigration
consequences in cases where the attorney general arguably retained discretion to withhold removal of a
deportable noncitizen, a question that has produced splits
in the lower courts and is the focus of a pending petition
for review in the Supreme Court.88 One court has found
no deficiency where the defendant represented in open
court that he was willing to take his chances despite the
uncertain possibility of deportation.8 9
On the other hand, vague warnings that the defendant
may or might be subject to deportation are not sufficient
where the defendant is clearly deportable. The Padilla
Court itself stated:
Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective date
of these amendments, his removal is practically
inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited
remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens
convicted of particular classes of offenses.90
Simply advising a client to seek outside immigration
advice, without more, can also be deficient.9'
Also left open is whether all immigration consequences must be addressed. At least one court has
suggested that the failure to give advice on all three major
immigration consequences-removal, naturalization, and
exclusion-is deficient.92 But another court found sufficient a warning that the defendant would be barred from
reentry, and did not mention removal or deportation specifically, where the defendant had been warned that "INS
[could] start INS proceedings against him" whether or
not he left the country. 93

REPORTER
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B. When Is Deficient Representation Prejudicial?
Perhaps the most difficult hurdle for a defendant raising a
Padillaclaim is showing prejudice under Strickland and
Hill-a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. In this context, prejudice
requires an analysis of many factors: the chance of success
at trial, the defendant's personal knowledge of any immigration consequences, any benefits accrued to the
defendant by pleading guilty, and whether the defendant
was otherwise deportable.
Even where counsel offers no advice about deportation,
defendants will generally be made aware of possible consequences during the plea colloquy. Long before the Court
decided Padilla, many federal and state judges were providing generic immigration warnings routinely. The
federal Bench Book has at least since 2007 advised federal
judges to ask noncitizen defendants before taking a plea,
"Do you understand that your plea of guilty may affect
your residency or your status with the immigration
authorities?" 9 4 Prior to 2010, thirty states mandated some
inquiry or warning regarding deportation consequences at
the plea hearing. 95 Where such a warning was given by the
judge, a defendant alleging his attorney failed to advise
him will be able to show prejudice only if he establishes
that he did not believe the judge, that he lied when he
stated in open court that he understood the judge's warning, or that the judge's warning did not convey the
information he deserved to hear, because it was not as specific as the warning he should have received from his
attorney. To date, most courts have not been particularly
sympathetic to such claims,9 6 but there have been some
exceptions. 97
A defendant who is able to make a credible claim of
lack of knowledge must also establish that "a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances."98 The rationality of the decision turns in
part "on the likely outcome of a trial had the defendant not
pleaded guilty."9 9 Given that immigration consequences
are equally certain if a defendant is convicted of the same
offense after trial rather than plea, and sometimes even
more certain,"oo a defendant must explain why a rational
person would have believed he could have prevailed at trial.o' Courts properly reject allegations of prejudice when
the defendant presents no strategy, defense, or basis for a
jury to reject evidence of guilt.
Courts also view with skepticism claims that a defendant
would have gone to trial where the defendant received a significant sentencing concession as a result of the plea.-o2
Allegations that the defendant would have rejected his plea
deal and negotiated a deal that did not carry immigration
consequences will only succeed if there is some proof that
such a deal was available.103 Some courts have concluded
that even if the defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability of acquittal, prejudice cannot be established so long as
another independent basis for removal exists, such as an
unchallenged convictiono 4 or drug addiction.105 Finally, a
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finding of possible prejudice, and a decision to hold a hearing on the issue, is more likely if the record suggests that
the defendant was weighing the risk of deportation prior to
entering the plea.'o 6
VII. Conclusion
Padilla will be available to petitioners who seek to challenge
their convictions after their direct appeals, theoretically
allowing a new round of challenges to guilty pleas that have
long been final. Nevertheless, procedural hurdles such as
filing deadlines and bars on successive petitions will allow
courts to dispose of many Padillaclaims without reaching
the merits. Petitioners who manage to obtain review on
the merits of their claim will face the daunting prospect of
showing that an objectively reasonable defendant would
have insisted on a trial. Although Padillawill probably
result in an increase in prisoner filings, successful collateral challenges will be more of a trickle than the roaring
stream of upset convictions evoked by the "floodgates"
imagery.
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See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) ("Even if
the defendant were not initially aware of [subsequently
excised] provision affording Attorney General discretion to
allow deportable aliens to remain, competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would
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308-309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that
where the "rule in question is one which of necessity requires
a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that
those applications themselves create a new rule.... Where
the beginning point is a rule of general application, a rule
designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of
factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a
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76 See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F3d 216, 221-22 (2005)
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Santos-Sanchez, No. 07-40145, 2010 WL 2465080 (5th Cir.
June 15, 2010) (citing Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F3d 292,
297 (5th Cir. 2004)) (a bar on readmission following removal
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claim on coram nobis, but finding no prejudice because petitioner was warned by the judge during the plea colloquy).
83 See People v. Cuatete, No. B218652, 2010 WL 1744891 (Cal.
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also People v. Barraza, No. H033755, 2010 WL 4252684
(Cal. Ct. App. 6th, Oct. 28, 2010).
84 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
85 Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
86 See Diunov v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 3184(KMW), 2010
WL 2483985 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010) (finding that the availability of a section 212(h) hardship waiver in the case of a
nonlawful permanent resident "does not fall into that category of cases where the immigration law is sufficiently
'succinct and straightforward' such that an attorney would
be, under Padilla, under an affirmative duty to advise his
client").
87 Many of these cases appear to involve pleas to misdemeanors, including failed efforts in drug courts, see, e.g., Flores v.
State, No. 4DO8-3866, 2010 WL 2882465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
79
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4th July 14, 2010); People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 13, 2010) (noting crimes to which petitioner pleaded were not the "automatic" kind because he was
sentenced to less than a year, but finding that Padilla
required that when the removal consequences were "unclear
or uncertain" counsel was constitutionally obliged to "do no
more than advise [him] that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences").
A petition for certiorari is pending, asking the Court to
resolve a question about which crimes are "particularly serious crimes," conviction of which terminate eligibility for
withholding of removal. Gao v. Holder, No. 10-130, 2010 WL
2912534 (July 22, 2010). The interplay between state criminal law and federal immigration consequences can generate
uncertainty. See, e.g., Caruchi-Resendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct.
2577, 2589 (2010) (holding that, even where factual basis
would have supported conviction for federal felony, defendant
must actually be convicted of a state "crime that is itself
punishable under federal law" for purposes of revocation of
eligibility for withholding of removal).
Nguyen v. state, No. A10-436, 2010 WL 4608348 (Minn. App.
Nov. 16, 2010).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479.
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(deficient advice to advise client he should seek outside
immigration advice, without more, at least where the immigration implications of the plea were fairly straightforward,
and where the "specialist's" advice was wrong); but see
Chhabra v. United States, No. 09cv1028, 2010 WL 4455822,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 3, 2010) (no prejudice where defendant
subsequently obtained competent advice from immigration
attorney); Diunov v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 3184(KMW),
2010 WL 2483985 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010). Other observers
have commented on the problem of erroneous immigration
advice offered by notarios and similar nonpractitioners. Gary
Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. TiMES,
June 11, 2006, at B1.
People v. Olide, No. F059034, 2010 WL 3419698 (Cal. Ct.
App. 5th Aug. 31, 2010) (when left out exclusion but warned
about deportation and naturalization, error, but no prejudice
shown).
People v. Mills, 28 Misc.3d 1236(A), 2010 WL 3619858, at
*2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (warning that defendant might be
barred from reentry was sufficient and that the successive
motion did not allege facts that were not or could not be considered in earlier motion).
Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court
Judges, at 75 (5th ed. 2007), available at http://www.fic.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Benchbk5.pdf/$file/Benchbk5.pdf.
Brief of the Nat'l. Assoc. of Crim. Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1AA, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651, 2009 WL 1567356 (June 2, 2009); see
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